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My thesis consists of three chapters on economic development.
Chapter 1:
The research on the catch-up process of a developing economy focuses on the role
of foreign technology transfer and the importance of domestic technology transfer lacks
study. We study the trends of expenditures on innovation, foreign technology transfer,
and domestic technology transfer. During the transition period of China from 1998 to
2007, the expenditures on innovation and domestic technology transfer of Chinese firms
in the manufacturing sector grow two times faster than the expenditure on foreign tech-
nology transfer.Furthermore, the estimated productivity at the firm level shows the rapid
productivity growth is accompanied by a decreasing productivity dispersion. The produc-
tivity dispersion has decreased by 39% in the same period. I document several empirical
facts at the level of industry. First, the innovation is positively correlated with the relative
productivity. Second,the expenditure on domestic technology transfer increases in the rel-
ative productivity and the growth rate of relative productivity is positively correlated to
the expenditure on domestic technology transfer.
Chapter 2:
I develop a theory in which firms endogenously choose one of three mutually exclusive
methods to increase productivity: innovation, foreign technology transfer, and domestic
technology transfer. Domestic technology transfer offers firms with low productivity
a chance to become highly productive by meeting highly productive domestic peers.
Domestic technology transfer leads to faster growth of productivity and greater number
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of firms with high productivity. The productivity growth in China makes more Chinese
firms choose to innovate or learn from domestic peers in a dynamic environment. Thus,
the expenditures on innovation and domestic technology transfer increase faster. In our
model, firms with low productivity adopt foreign or domestic technology and grow faster
than highly productive firms. This results in the decreasing productivity observed in
the data. We use the simulated method of moments to estimate key parameter values
of the transition model. Our model fits data well. After checking the model fit, we
conduct two experiments to answer the two questions mentioned at the beginning of our
talk. In one experiment, domestic technology transfer is not allowed, and I find that
the domestic technology transfer contributes 30% of productivity growth and 31% of
relative innovation expenditure growth. In the other experiment, we improve the domestic
intellectual property and the policy changes significantly reduce both productivity growth
and expenditure on innovation.
Chapter 3:
Our economic geography model features cross-country productivity, human capital,
amenity and population differences, international trade, migration cost, and heteroge-
neous working and entrepreneurial skills. We compare welfare under baseline parameter-
ization with a migration autarky counterfactual and the welfare gains of the US native
residents from migration reform. The gains from migration are substantial, as high as
trade gains, and natives in countries that received a lot of migration are much better off,
at about 5% to 15% . Both the native entrepreneurs and workers benefit from migration
while the entrepreneurs tend to gain twice as large as the workers. The welfare of the US
native entrepreneurs and workers can increase by 5.1% and 1.6% by optimizing migration
frictions and the population of the US increases by 14.7% under optimization.
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CHAPTER 1
The transition of Chinese Manufacturing in
Technology Development
1.1 Introduction
In the past decades, China’s economy and real per capita income grew at a high rate.
Some economists argue that the future growth in China relies on innovation and tech-
nology upgrading[WXZ17]. The literature discusses how expenditure on innovation rises
with the boom of patent applications and patents granted[WXZ17, XZ15].Another strand
of literature, which focuses on the transition from imitation to innovation, emphasizes
the tradeoff between imitating foreign firms (foreign technology transfer) and innovation
(R&D)[Ace03a, MB95].This reveals the force behind productivity growth and innovation
expenditure increase in the transition of a developing country. However, recent work on
the tradeoff between imitation and innovation shows both learning from other domes-
tic firms (domestic technology transfer) and innovation are vital to the economy growth
in the long run. Motivated by the literature, this paper explores how domestic tech-
nology transfer affects productivity growth and innovation expenditure increases in the
transition.
To answer the question, we have constructed a dynamic model in which domestic
firms are heterogeneous in productivity and adopt different ways to improve productiv-
ity. They can attempt to use technology employed by other foreign and domestic firms
or increase productivity by innovation (R&D). The decision of a firm on productivity
depends on relative domestic productivity to foreign productivity and the relative pro-
ductivity of the domestic firm to other domestic firms. Domestic firms tend to imitate
foreign technology when relative domestic productivity is low. Otherwise, domestic firms
are less willing to pay for foreign technology. Whether to imitate technology used by other
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domestic firms depends on how far the firm is behind other domestic firms in productiv-
ity. In our model, the highly productive firms innovate and transfer technology to other
domestic firms. These firms cannot get more productive technology from other domestic
and foreign firms and have to rely on innovation to improve productivity. Firms with
low productivity tend to adopt technology from other domestic firms, and middle firms
prefer technology transfer from foreign firms. Compared with foreign technology trans-
fer, adopting domestic technology induces lower costs but improvement of technology
depends on the average domestic productivity. Unproductive firms could obtain technol-
ogy improvement from other domestic firms and benefit from the lower costs. However,
middle firms are not very likely to meet more productive domestic firms and increase
their productivity. As a consequence, they would rather spend more and obtain greater
technology from foreign firms.
Our paper emphasizes two channels through which domestic technology transfer can
affect innovation in the transition. The first and direct channel is that domestic technol-
ogy transfer encourages firms to do more innovation as a subsidy. We assume the firm
that adopts domestic technology meets another domestic firm after a random search and
pays a share of surplus generated by the transfer as a result of Nash bargaining. Due to
the random search, heterogeneous firms that transfer technology would meet firms with
the same expected productivity. Thus the payment received by a firm transferring tech-
nology is proportional to its own productivity. To some extent, transferring technology to
less productive firms provides extra incentives to innovative firms and encourages them
to spend more on innovation.
The other channel works indirectly. Domestic technology transfer offers a probability
for a unproductive firm to gain a large increase in productivity and to become a highly
productive firm. The greater the share of productive firms due to domestic technology
transfer, the greater the share of innovative firms in the future and thus the more firms
spend on innovation. The literature on imitation and innovation in the long run steady
state shows that imitation is a alternative way to improve productivity other than inno-
vation and that the existence of imitation can help long run growth but discourage firms
to innovate[BPT17]. However, domestic technology transfer in our paper is different from
imitation in the literature in two aspects. First, domestic technology transfer provides
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extra incentives for innovation. Second, adopting domestic technology does not crowd
out innovation during the transition. In our model, unproductive middle firms would
choose between adopting domestic technology and foreign technology while productive
middle firms decide whether to innovate or adopt foreign technology. Thus only foreign
technology transfer is able to crowd out innovation during the transition.
The paper is part of the literature on the tradeoff between innovation and the transfer
of foreign technology in developing countries[AAZ06, CCG14, MB95, Ace03b, BPT14].In
the literature, [MB95] were the first to discuss the mechanism by which a poor country
chooses to copy foreign technology rather than innovation. The cost of copying foreign
cost gradually rises as the poor country catches up with the foreign country. [BPT14]
explore the catch-up of poor country and how the cost of technology diffusion determines
convergence and fall-back of the poor country in the long run. [Ace03b] and [AAZ06]
focus on the firm strategy of innovation and imitation as the economy approaches the
world technology frontier and whether the economy can converge with the frontier. In
[Ace03b], the key factor that determines convergence is outsourcing of production, while
[AAZ06] show how the tradeoff between the skill of a manager and capital plays a vital
role. Our paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we model heterogeneous
firms in the transition. Firms in our economy adopt different strategies of development
during the same period. Second, we focus on the interaction between domestic technology
imitation and innovation although the tradeoff between foreign technology imitation and
innovation is important as well. [CCG14] is the only paper that incorporates the three
strategies discussed in our paper. However, the transfer of foreign technology in their
paper is limited to foreign directed investment firms, and the rest can either innovate or
imitate other firms. The other difference is that the firm that adopts technology in our
model will apply the technology to a different variety while the firm in their paper will
steal the market owned by the firm it imitates.
Our paper also relates to another strand of literature that explores the role of do-
mestic imitation in growth [ABL08, LM14, Lut07, KLZ16, PT14, BPT17, KSS18]. In
the literature, domestic imitation contributes to the long run growth of the economy and
the growth effect of imitation depends on the support and tail thickness of productivity
distribution. Following the tradition of the literature, we model the domestic technology
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transfer as the result of a random search . Domestic technology transfer is featured with
payment from the imitator to the imitatee, while imitation in the literature is free. Moti-
vated by [ACG16], the payment in transfer is determined by Nash Bargaining. [BPT17]
and [KSS18] provide analysis on the interaction between imitation and innovation with
discrete and continuous productivity distribution. Our paper incorporates foreign tech-
nology adoption other than domestic technology transfer , and innovation and adopting
foreign technology is taken as an important source of growth for developing countries such
as China[WXZ17]. We apply the theory to the case of the Chinese transition economy and
quantify the effect of domestic technology transfer on growth and innovation. [KSS18]
provides a model incorporating domestic imitation and innovation of Chinese firms. But
they emphasize the distortion on innovation faced by Chinese firms and explain why
innovation investments are less productive in China.
The main contribution of the paper is to estimate the importance of domestic tech-
nology transfer to innovation and productivity growth based on the theory: we use a
Simulated Method of Moments approach to estimate a dynamic transition equilibrium
model that incorporates the interactions between domestic technology transfer and inno-
vation.We estimate the model using data of Chinese firms in manufacturing from 1998 to
2007 and targeting aggregate expenditure on innovation, domestic and foreign technology
transfer and productivity distribution. According to the Chinese Statistics Yearbook of
Science and Technology, the expenditure of Chinese manufacturing firms on domestic
technology transfer and innovation rose dramatically over the past ten years. Domestic
technology transfer payments increased from 1.82 billion Yuan to 12.96 billion Yuan, and
innovation expenditure surged from 19.71 billion Yuan to 211.25 billion Yuan. Compared
with the trend of expenditure on foreign technology transfer, which only went up from
21.48 to 45.25 billion, relative domestic technology payment surged from 8.5% to 28.5%
and innovation from 91% to 466%. The transition during this period also features increas-
ing average productivity and decreasing distance to frontier. The average productivity of
manufacturing in China relative to the US surged from 4.6% to 12.4% . And the distance
to frontier within industry, which measures the log difference between the most and least
productive firms within the same industry, dropped from 3.92 to 3.53.
Our model fits the trends of productivity growth and innovation expenditure. The
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average productivity of manufacturing in China relative to the US surged to 10.68%, and
relative innovation expenditure increased to 239%. In other words, the model accounts
for 79.8% of productivity growth and 46.4% of innovation expenditure increase. The first
experiment is conducted to figure out the importance of domestic technology transfer
to productivity growth and innovation increase. In the first experiment, we increase
the cost of domestic technology transfer such that no firms adopt domestic technology,
which results in reductions of productivity growth and innovation increase by 57% and
64% , respectively. The second experiment examines the effects of intellectual property
rights(IPR) protection on growth and innovation in transition. Increasing the strength
of IPR protection would result in greater bargaining power of the imitatee in our model.
When we increase the share of surplus gained by the imitatee from 0.6% to 1.2%, the
growth of productivity decreases by 35% and expenditure on innovation by 48% in the
period.
1.2 Empirical Facts
Since the reform in 1978, the Chinese economy has experienced a great transition. [Zhu12]
argues 1998-2007 is an important phase during the transition. In 2007, China’s govern-
ment started to legalize the development of private enterprises. Between 1998 and 2007,
the average annual total factor productivity growth rates of the state and non-state sec-
tors were 5.50 percent and 3.67 percent, respectively. The manufacturing sector grows
even faster during the same period. [BVZ12] estimate that, for the manufacturing sector,
the total factor productivity growth rate is 13.4 percent a year.
Our paper focuses on the manufacturing sector between 1998 and 2007. Adopting for-
eign technology, domestic technology transfer, and innovation are three ways for Chinese
manufacturing firms to improve their productivity. Using industry level data from the
Chinese Science and Technology Yearbook, we find Chinese firms spend most on adopting
foreign technology in 1998 while the expenditure on innovation becomes the greatest in
2007 (Figure 1). The spending on domestic technology transfer and innovation is 8.5%,
and 91% of this on foreign technology transfer in 1991. During the ten years, expendi-
tures on domestic technology and innovation grow rapidly and the growth rate of foreign
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technology expenditure is moderate. In the year 2007, the ratios of expenditures on do-
mestic technology transfer and innovation to foreign technology transfer increase to 0.29
and 4.66 respectively.
Figure 1.1: Expenditure on Technology Transfer and Innovation
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Another important trend is the distance to frontier of productivity distribution. Using
the Annual Survey of Above Scale Industrial Firms from 1998-2007, we calculate firm
productivity according to [BVZ12] and [HK09]. The distance to frontier in an industry
is defined as the productivity log difference between the 90th and 10th percentile firms
in the industry. The average distance to frontier of manufacturing, which is weighted
by value added, dropped from 3.92 to 3.53 in the period. This fact means the annual
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growth rate of the 10th percentile firm is approximately 4% greater than that of 90th
percentile firm on average. Consistent with [Zhu12] and [BVZ12], we observe the rapid
growth of relative productivity of Chinese manufacturing. The average growth rate of
Chinese manufacturing productivity relative to the US is as high as 12.7% . This results
in relative productivity increase from 4.6% to 12.4% in ten years.
Figure 1.2: Distance to Domestic Frontier and Relative Productivity
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Controlling value added, exporting share of products, capital per worker, number of
firms, and year dummy, we find one percent point increases of relative productivity and
distance to frontier are associated with a 0.26 and 0.29 percent point domestic technology
transfer payment (Table 2). We explore the correlation between domestic technology
transfer and relative productivity growth rate as well. The correlation coefficient is 0.05
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Table 1.1: Domestic Technology Expenditure
ln(DE) TFP Growth
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(TFP ) .3336∗∗ .2629∗ −.3067∗∗∗
(.1509) (.1516) (.0467)
ln(Dist) .3289∗∗∗ .2965∗∗∗ −.0594∗
(.0638) (.1130) (.0336)
ln(DE) .0512∗∗∗
(.0193)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 260 260 260 231
R2 0.5866 0.5933 0.5966 0.1859
Notes : The dependent variables are the log of domestic expenditure for column (1) (2) (3)
and the productivity growth rate for column (4). Productivity is the relative productivity
of the Chinese manufacturing industry to the US. Dist represents the distance to frontier
in the industry. ln(.) indicates the variable is the log value of the variable in the brackets.
Robust standard errors are in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant
at the 10 percent level
and significant at the1 percent confidence level.
1.3 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the empirical facts on the transition of China from 1998 to 2007.
It shows Chinese firms changed their ways to develop productivity during the transition
and they spent more on innovation and domestic technology transfer compared with
foreign technology transfer. The industry level evidence indicates the expenditure on
domestic technology transfer is positively correlated with the growth rate of productivity
in the industry and the growth productivity would increase the expenditure on innovation
8
and domestic technology transfer payment.
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CHAPTER 2
The Contributions of Domestic Technology Transfer
to Innovation and Productivity Growth
2.1 The Transition Dynamic Model
In this section, we develop a theory of transition economy that is consistent with previous
evidence and featured with the endogenous choice of innovation and technology transfer.
A. Demography and Preference
The model economy is a small open economy, and the interest rate is R. Time is discrete
and infinite, t = 1, 2, 3.... The economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents
who live for two periods. In the first period, the agents own one unit of labor and earn
a wage as workers. They save or borrow money to consume at the end of the period. In
the second period, the agents become old and lose their ability to work. But they inherit
the firm from their parents. They claim the profits from the firm and consume the saving
and income in the second period. Preferences of agents are the following time separable
utility function.
Ut =
c
1− 1
θ
1,t − 1
1− 1
θ
+ δ
c
1− 1
θ
2,t − 1
1− 1
θ
(2.1)
s.t. c1,t +
c2,t
R
= wt +
pi1,t+1
R
,where β is the discount factor and θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption. The agent born at time t consumes c1,t and c2,t in the first and second
periods of his life, wt is his wage earning in period t ,and pi1,t+1is the firm profit that he
claims in period t+ 1.
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B. Production
There are two sectors in production: the intermediate sector and the final sector. The
final sector consists of competitive firms. These firms use intermediate goods, and labor
to produce final goods, and the production technology is
Yt =
1
1− αL
α
ft
∫ 1
0
qαjtk
1−α
jt dj (2.2)
, where Yt is the output of final goods. Lft is the labor used to produce final goods. The
intermediate good is continuous and indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], qjt represents the quality of
intermediate j in period t, and kjt represents the quantity. In the final good production
function, σ < 1. The marginal return of intermediate goods in production is decreasing
in quantities. The final firm tends to use various intermediate goods as inputs in the
production.
Final firms maximize profits by choosing an optimal amount of labor and varieties of
intermediate goods. Given the production technology of the final sector, the problem is
max
kjt,Lft
1
1− αL
α
ft
∫ 1
0
qαjtk
1−α
jt dj −
∫ 1
0
pjtkjtdj − wtLft (2.3)
, where pjt is the price of intermediate good j and wt is the wage rate of workers in
the labor market. We derive the inverse demand functions for intermediate goods and
labor from first order conditions,
pjt = L
α
ftq
α
jtk
α−1
jt (2.4)
wt =
α
1− αL
α−1
ft
∫ 1
0
qαjtk
1−α
jt dj (2.5)
The final firms produce more final goods using the intermediate good with higher qual-
ity and thus the price of the intermediate good with greater quality is higher. The quality
of intermediate goods also affects the wage rate of the economy. The wage rate increases
in intermediate good quality because labor and intermediate goods are complementary
in production.
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The firms in the intermediate sector are monopolistic, and the only input of interme-
diate goods is labor. The production technology of the intermediate firm is
kjt = q¯ljt (2.6)
, where q¯t =
∫ 1
0
qjtdj is the average quality of intermediate goods in the sector. In
other words, the quantity of intermediate good production is independent of its quality,
but the firm’s profits increase in its quality. We calculate productivity using the value of
output in the empirical section, and the measured productivity is equivalent to quality in
our model. Workers in the labor market are employed either by intermediate or by final
sector. In the production sectors,
(1)the profits of the intermediate firms are linear in their productivity;
(2)the wage rate is proportional to the average productivity of the intermediate sector;
(2)the share of labor employed by the intermediate sector is invariant over time
Proof. Appendix
B. Productivity of the Intermediate Firms
The intermediate Firms are heterogeneous in productivity, and the productivity is qt. In
period t, the productivity distribution is Gt(qt) and the support is qt ∈ [qMt ,∞). We
assume foreign firms are homogeneous in productivity and their productivity is A¯, which
is constant over time. We have derived that the profits of the intermediate firms are linear
in their productivity. The domestic firm owners make an optimal decision on productivity
to maximize the firm profits. We assume that the measure of intermediate firms is 1 and
each old agent owns one firm. When the old agent dies, the firm is inherited by a young
agent. For simplicity, we assume the old receives no compensation from giving the firm
to the young. Therefore, the old does not consider the profits of the firm in the future
when he makes decisions on technology development. When the firm is taken over by the
young, the productivity of the firm does not change.
We focus on innovation and technology adoption and ignore the selection in the tran-
sition. In other words, we do not consider firm entry and exit. The reason our model
does not incorporate the explicit firm entry and exit is that the firm selection is a form of
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imitation [Lut07] . In our model, the least productive firms adopt technology from other
domestic firms , and their productivity increases to the level of the firm they meet. The
process is similar to that in which the least productive firms exit and new firms enter with
productivity drawn from the productivity distribution of incumbent firm. The literature
on innovation and imitation also does not model the entry and exit [BPT17, KSS18].
We assume firm innovation, foreign and domestic technology transfer are mutually
exclusive. Firm owners choose one of the three ways to maximize the profit of the current
period
pit(qt−1) = max{piRt (qt−1), piFt (qt−1), piDt (qt−1)} (2.7)
, where qt−1 is the productivity of the firm at the beginning of period t. The
profits from innovation, and foreign and domestic technology transfer are denoted as
piRt (qt−1), pi
F
t (qt−1),and
piDt (qt−1)
, respectively.
If the firm owner decides to innovate, he faces the following problem,
piRt (qt−1) = max
γt
pi∗(1 + γt)qt−1 − (χRγψt qt−1 + ηRqt−1) + τD((1 + γt)qt−1, θD) (2.8)
, where γt is the growth rate of productivity in period t and productivity at the end
of period t is (1 + γt)qt−1. The profits of the firm by innovation are determined by three
components: profit from sales, cost of innovation, and gain from transferring technology.
pi∗(1+γt)qt−1 represents the profits from sales and pi∗ is the constant coefficient. The cost
of innovation has two parts: the variable cost , χRγψt qt−1 , and the fixed cost, η
Rqt−1. The
variable innovation cost increases in the growth rate of productivity and ηRqt−1 is linear in
the productivity. χR governs the variable cost of innovation and affects the average growth
rate of innovative firms. ψ is the convexity of innovation cost with respect to the growth
rate and affects the changes in the innovation growth rate over time and the distribution
of innovation growth rate. ηR is the cost parameter of fixed cost and determines the
share of firms choosing innovation. At last, τD((1 + γt)qt−1, θD) represents the gain from
transferring technology. The expression of the gain will be spelled out below.
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If the firm adopts foreign technology, the owner will decide the amount of foreign
technology to purchase,
piFt (qt−1) = max
λt
pi∗(qt−1 + λtA¯)− χFλβt A¯− τ˜F (θF ) + τD(qt−1 + λtA¯, θD) (2.9)
, where λtA¯ represents the amount of foreign technology that the firm decides to
adopt and A¯ is the level of foreign technology. At the end of the period, the productivity
increases to qt−1+λtA¯. The variable cost of adopting foreign technology ,χFλ
β
t A¯, increases
in how much the domestic firm learns from foreign firms. The domestic firm need to make
a payment to foreign firms as well, and the payment is denoted by τ˜F (θF ). The domestic
firm that adopts foreign technology can transfer its technology to these firms that adopt
domestic technology and gain the revenue, τD(qt−1 + λtA¯, θD) .
The last way that domestic firms can develop their productivity is through domestic
technology transfer. The problem of domestic technology transfer is
piDt (qt−1) =
∫
(pi∗q − τ˜D(q, qt−1, θD))dGt(q|q ∈ ΦR ∪ ΦF )− ηDqt−1 (2.10)
The timing of innovation and technology adoption is important. At the beginning of
period t, the firm decides to innovate or adopt technology. It takes one period for the
firm to innovate or digest the foreign technology. However, the domestic firm (imitator)
needs one period to randomly search other domestic firms (imitatee) and meet the firm
and purchase technology at the end of the period. Since the domestic technology transfer
occurs at the end of the period, imitatees have increased their productivity through
innovation and foreign technology transfer and the productivity distribution is denoted
by Gt(q|q ∈ ΦR ∪ ΦF ) , ,where ΦR and ΦF are the sets of firms doing innovation and
adopting foreign technology. When the imitator meets an imitatee with productivity q,
the imitator’s productivity jumps to q and the imitator pays τ˜D(q, qt−1, θD) . To search
the imitatee, the imitator bears the search cost, ηDqt−1. The search cost is linear in
the firm’s productivity, which is the same as in [BPT17]. One important assumption
we make here is that the imitator will not meet other imitators.This assumption yields a
clean truncation of the distribution, with no mass of firms perpetually left behind. [PT14]
have the same assumption on imitation.
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Different from pure imitation, the imitatee has IPR on their technology and can pre-
vent others from learning their technology. We assume the payment of technology transfer
is the result of Nash Bargaining. The bargaining powers of the domestic imitator against
a foreign and domestic imitatee are θF and θD, respectively. Thus the domestic imita-
tor keeps the share ,θF (θD), of surplus generated by the foreign (domestic) technology
transfer, and the rest of the surplus is the payment of technology transfer. The matching
function between imitators and imitatees is
H = M(sDt , s
R
t + s
F
t ) = (s
D
t )
µ(sRt + s
F
t )
1−µ (2.11)
We assume the probability that the imitator finds an imitatee is always 1 and thus
µ = 1. Then the measure of imitators that an imitatee can meet is H
sRt +s
F
t
=
sDt
sRt +s
F
t
.
If
sDt
sRt +s
F
t
> 1, this means that the imitatee sells its technology to several imitators. If
sDt
sRt +s
F
t
< 1, some imitatees at the end of the period may fail to meet any imitator.
The payment of a imitator, qt−1 ,that adopt technology from a domestic firm, q , is
τ(q, qt−1, θD) = (1− θD)pi∗(q − qt−1) (2.12)
We derive the expression of payment received by domestic firms,
τD(q, θD) =
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)pi∗(q − Ej(qj|GDt−1)) (2.13)
, where sDt ,s
F
t , and s
R
t are shares of firms that adopt domestic and foreign technology
and conduct innovation and sDt + s
F
t + s
R
t = 1. G
D
t−1 is the productivity distribution of
imitator firms at the beginning of period t. At the end of the period, the imitatee firm
meets heterogeneous imitator firms.The measure of imitators is
sDt
sRt +s
F
t
, and their expected
productivity is Ej(qj|GDt−1). On average the productivity of an imitator jumps from
Ej(qj|GDt−1) to q and the difference q − Ej(qj|GDt−1) represents the surplus of technology
transfer.
The payment that a domestic firm makes to the foreign firm for technology transfer
has the following expression,
τ˜F = (1− θF )(pi∗λtA¯+ s
D
t
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)pi∗λtA¯) (2.14)
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The productivity increase from the foreign technology transfer is λtA¯. The imitator
gains additional output λtA¯ and the domestic imitator’s payment
sDt
sRt +s
F
t
(1 − θD)pi∗λtA¯.
The foreign firm shares both the additional output and the domestic imitator’s payment.
C. Equilibrium during Transition
When adopting technology from foreign firms, the domestic firm bears the cost of digest-
ing foreign technology and the cost increases in the amount of foreign technology they
adopt. When the firms spend money on innovation, the innovation expenditure increases
in the growth rate of firms as well. Therefore, the firm owners make decisions on the
optimal rates of both innovation and foreign technology adoption. Plugging equation
2.12 into equation 2.8 and equation 2.14 into equation 2.9, we can derive optimal rates
from the first order conditions. There exists the optimal growth rate of the innovative
firm and the optimal rate of foreign technology adoption,
γ∗t = ((1 +
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)) pi
∗
ψχR
)
1
ψ−1 (2.15)
λ∗t = ((1 +
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD))pi
∗θF
βχF
)
1
β−1 (2.16)
Proof. See Appendix
Other than the optimal rates, we find the way that firms choose to develop productiv-
ity depends on the productivity of the firm. Given several regularity conditions, there
exist two thresholds in the productivity distribution qRFt−1 and q
DF
t−1 in period t such that
(1)firms innovate if their productivity q > qRFt−1;
(2)firms adopt foreign technology if their productivity q ∈ [qDFt−1, qRFt−1];
(3)firms adopt domestic technology if their productivity q < qDFt−1
, where qRFt−1 and q
DF
t−1 are determined by
piDt (q
DF
t−1) = pi
F
t (q
DF
t−1) (2.17)
piRt (q
RF
t−1) = pi
F
t (q
RF
t−1) (2.18)
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Proof. See Appendix
Figure
Figure 2.1: gains after technology development
Notes : This figure shows the gains, of firms that develop productivity through innovation,
foreign and domestic technology transfer, ∆pi, against firm productivity q. The three lines
R, F , and D represent the profit gains from innovation,foreign and domestic technology
transfer, respectively.
Given the thresholds in the productivity distribution, we have the shares of firms
innovating and adopting technology in period t,
sRt = 1−Gt−1(qRFt−1) (2.19)
sFt = Gt−1(q
RF
t−1)−Gt−1(qDFt−1) (2.20)
sDt = Gt−1(q
DF
t−1) (2.21)
The distribution of productivity evolves as domestic firms develop their productivity.
We assume the support of the initial productivity is [qM0 ,∞). During the transition, the
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lower bound of distribution support is
qMt = q
DF
t−1 + λtA¯ (2.22)
As we have shown in proposition 2.1, the firms whose productivity is less than qDFt−1
choose to search other domestic firms and copy their technology. At the end of period t,
the least productive firms that adopt foreign technology increase their productivity from
qDFt−1 to q
DF
t−1 + λtA¯. These firms are the least productive firms that domestic imitator
firms can meet. Thus the minimum productivity of all firms at the end of period t is
qDFt−1 + λtA¯. The productivity distribution has the following evolution,
gt(q) =

1
1−Gt−1(qDFt−1)
1
1+γt
gt−1(
q
1+γt
) q > qut
1
1−Gt−1(qDFt−1)
gt−1(q − λtA¯) q < qlt
1
1+γt
gt−1( q1+γt )+gt−1(q−λtA¯)
1−Gt−1(qDFt−1)
qlt < q < q
u
t and q
RF
t−1 <
λtA¯
γt
(2.23)
, where qlt and q
u
t are minimum and maximum between q
RF
t−1(1 + γt) and q
RF
t−1 + λtA¯.
The firms with productivity qRFt−1 gain the same profits from adopting foreign technol-
ogy. However, the productivity of these firms would be qRFt−1 + λtA¯ if they adopt foreign
technology and qRFt−1(1 + γt) if they innovate. Because time is discrete in our model, it
is possible that these firms whose productivity is less than qRFt−1 adopt foreign technology
and end up with productivity higher than those innovative firms.
The first line of the productivity evolution equation describes the tail of productivity
distribution. Two types of firms make up of the tail firms at the end of period: the
productive firms that choose innovation and the firms that adopt domestic technology
and meet the first type of firms. For the first type of firm with productivity q at the end
of the period, their productivity is q
1+γt
in the last period and the density of these firms is
reduced to 1
1+γt
gt−1(
q
1+γt
). The second type of firm increases the density of productivity
distribution and the density of the second type of firm is linear in the density of the first
type of firms,
sDt
1−sDt
1
1+γt
gt−1(
q
1+γt
).
The second line is the expression of the productivity density function of less productive
firms. The firms described by this line consist of two types of firms as well. The first type
of firms is the firm that adopts foreign technology and the second type is the domestic
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imitator that meets them. The density of the first type is gt−1(q − λtA¯), and the second
type contributes the same multiplier 1
1−Gt−1(qDFt−1)
.
The third line provides the density function for the case in which the innovative
firms grow faster than those firms purchasing foreign technology. And the density in the
overlapping area of support is the sum of densities in the first and second lines. Given
an initial distribution G0(q) , the value of A¯ and the sequence {Rt}t≥0, the transition
equilibrium is a sequence of firm-specific variables {pjt, kjt, qjt+1}j∈[0,1],t≥0 and a sequence
of aggregate variables {wt, Lft, sDt , sFt , sDt , qDFt , qRFt , Gt}t≥ such that
(1) firm owners decide optimal price and quantity{pjt, kjt}t≥0 to maximize the inter-
mediate firm’s profits;
(2) labor wage{wt}t≥0 clears labor market, L(t) +
∫
ljtdj = 1;
(3) firm owners choose the optimal way to increase {qjt}j∈[0,1],t≥0 to {qjt+1}j∈[0,1],t≥0
in order to maximize the firm owner’s income;
(4) the productivity distribution{Gt(q)}t≥0 evolves as equations 2.22 and 2.23;
(5) the shares of firms adopting technology and innovating {sDt , sFt , sDt }t≥0 are defined
by equations 2.19,2.21, and 2.20;
(6) two thresholds in the productivity distribution {qDFt , qRFt } are determined by the
indifference equations 2.17 and 2.18. We observe the surge of expenditure on innova-
tion, and foreign and domestic technology transfer during the transition, The aggregate
expenditures on innovation, and the aggregate foreign and domestic technology transfer
payments in our model are
TRt = (
1
ψ
γt + η
R)
∫ ∞
qRFt−1
qdGt−1(q) (2.24)
T Ft = (1− θF )(λtA¯+
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)λA¯)sFt (2.25)
TDt = (1− θD)
∫ qDFt−1
qMt−1
∫ ∞
qDFt−1+λtA¯
(q − q′)dGt−1(q)dGt−1(q′) (2.26)
Innovation expenditure TRt includes both variable and fixed costs of innovation. The
innovation expenditure of a firm depends on its productivity. Therefore, the aggregate
expenditure is the integral of firm expenditure over innovative firms. The aggregate
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foreign technology transfer payment is the product of firm payment and the measure of
firms adopting foreign technology. The costs of adopting domestic technology consist
of search cost and transfer payment. The empirical part corresponds to the transfer
payment. We aggregate firm transfer payment over the support of domestic imitators
and imitatees with heterogeneous productivity.
The transition is featured with the rapid growth of productivity and decreasing dis-
tance to frontier within the domestic industry. In the model, the productivity and dis-
tance to frontier are measured by
TFPt =
∫ ∞
qMt
qdGt(q) (2.27)
Crt =
qMt
qMt−1
− γt (2.28)
The final goods production function is linear in the average productivity of inter-
mediate firms and thus the expression 2.27 measures the average productivity of both
intermediate and final sectors. The expression 2.28 reflects how fast the firms at the lower
bound catch up with the frontier firms. The frontier firms always choose to innovate, and
the growth rate is γt.
2.2 Structural Estimation and Experiments
In this section, we estimate the model laid out in section 3. The estimation focuses on
matching empirical moments during 1998-2006, which is covered by the dataset we have.
Some parameters are calibrated and the rest are estimated by the Simulated Method of
Moments [Blo09]. The results are summarized in Table ??.
The parameters we calibrate include the initial distribution G0, the foreign firm
productivity,A¯, innovation cost ηR,ψ and the bargaining power against foreign firms,
θF .
We assume the initial distribution is a Pareto distribution, P (qM0 , b), in which q
M
0 de-
termines the average productivity of firms and b determines the shape of the productivity
tail. We normalize the value of qM0 to 1. The year 1998 is set as the initial period. In
1998, the average ratio of mean to median over the productivity distributions of different
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Parameters Value Target/Source Data Model
qm0 1 Normalization
b 1.16 Productivity Distribution in 1998 7.25 7.25
A¯ 149 Relative Productivity in 1998 4.6% 4.9%
ψ 8 R&D intensity in 2005 0.08% 0.08%
ηR 0.06 Share of R&D firms in 2005 9.6% 10.2%
θF 0.4 Relative R&D Expenditure in 1998 0.92 0.88
β 2.90
θD 0.994 SMM
ηD 5.74
Table 2.1: Parameter Values and Targets
industries is 7.25. We let b = 1.16 such that the ratio of the Pareto distribution equals
the value in 1998. Foreign firm productivity, A¯ , is set so that the relative productivity
of Chinese firms in 1998 is 4.6% of that of US firms. This yields A¯ = 149.
The parameters that are related to innovation cost, ηR and ψ, are set to match two
empirical moments: (1) the share of firms innovating and (2) the innovation expenditure
intensity in the Annual Survey of Above Scale Industrial Firms 2005. The innovation
expenditure intensity is the innovation expenditure divided by total sales. ηR governs the
fixed cost of innovation, and ψ measures the curvature of variable cost. There are 9.6%
of firms doing innovation in 2005 and the average intensity is 0.08%. We let ηR = 0.06
and ψ = 8 such that the share of innovative firms is 10.2% and the innovation intensity is
0.08% in 2005. The parameter θF measures the bargaining power of domestic imitators,
and the domestic imitator can grab more surplus generated by foreign technology transfer
if the parameter is larger. The target of this parameter is the ratio of innovation expen-
diture over foreign technology transfer payment in 1998. We set the parameter θF = 0.4
such that the ratio is 0.88, slightly lower than the ratio in the data (0.92).
We have the remaining three parameters ω = {θD, ηD, β} to be estimated. The
vector of moments y = {Crt, (T
D
t
TFt
)}t=1998−2006 includes the catch-up rates and the ratios
of domestic transfer payment over foreign transfer payment from 1998 to 2006 and we
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minimize the objective function
ωˆ = arg min
ω∈Ω
[Λ(ω)− Λ(y)]W [Λ(ω)− Λ(y)]′
,where W is a weighted diagonal matrix and the diagonal elements are Wii =
1
Λi(y)2
.
Λ(ω)−Λ(y) represents the differences between moments in the data and moments in our
model.
Figure 2.2: Transition in the Model Economy
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Notes : The figure shows the transition of key variables during the transition in the model
economy. The solid and dashed lines refer to variables in the model economy and data.
The dynamics of the transition in our model economy are illustrated in Figure 5.
Panels A-D display various macroeconomic trends of the model against the data. The
values of moments in the data and these generated by the model are available in Appendix
B.2.
First of all, the estimated model economy generates almost the same speed catch-up
rate as its empirical counterpart (Panel A). The catch-up rate is determined by three
factors: the innovation growth rate, the amount of foreign technology transfer, and the
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share of domestic imitators. The growth of innovative tail firms increases the distance
to frontier, while the adoption of foreign and domestic technology decrease it. During
the transition of our model economy, the growth rate of innovative firms is stable (6.7
percent). The amount of foreign technology transfer is stable as well, but the effect
of foreign technology on the distance to frontier is decreasing over time because the
productivity of bottom firms grows rapidly. However, the share of domestic imitator
rises (7.24% to 12.73% ), which compensates for the reduced effect of foreign technology.
Therefore, the distance to frontier in our model economy exhibits a high decreasing rate
during the transition period.
The other trend is on the growth of relative domestic transfer payment (Panel D).
The relative domestic transfer payment is the domestic technology payment divided by
the payment of foreign technology transfer. The trend in our model economy has a slight
U shape because of the growing productivity. In the first half of the period, the bottom
firms grow faster than the tail firms and more and more firms prefer to adopt foreign
technology. In the second half of the period, adopting foreign technology is no longer as
profitable as before because of the faster productivity growth of both bottom and tail
firms.
Third, the average productivity trend during the transition tracks remarkably well
with the growth rate of Chinese manufacturing productivity (Panel B). Recall that we do
not target the moments of productivity when we estimate the parameters. The relative
productivity in our model accounts for 79.8% of productivity growth. The productivity
relative to the US increases from 4.87% to 11.13%, and the productivity in our data surges
from 4.57% to 12.41%. The contribution of adopting foreign technology to productivity
is decreasing and the contribution of domestic technology is growing. Thus the growth of
productivity in our model keeps a high rate in the transition. Last, our model generates
a sizable increase in relative innovation expenditure growth. The relative innovation
expenditure to foreign technology adoption payment is 91.76% in 1998 and 466.85% in
2007. In our model, the relative innovation expenditure grows from 90.94% to 265.69%
(Panel C). The growth in our model accounts for 46.4% of the empirical counterpart.
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B. Experiments
We have two experiments in the section. The first experiment changes the fixed cost
parameter of domestic technology adoption,ηD. We first increase the value of the fixed
cost from 5.74 to 5.78 to figure out the changes caused by the greater cost of adopting
domestic technology. The increased cost of domestic technology transfer leads to a smaller
catch-up rate. We find the catch-up rate in the first half of the period is not affected very
much, but the effects due to the change become significant in the second half of the period.
The foreign and domestic technology transfers are two forces that drive the bottom firms
to catch up with the frontier. In the first half of the period, the force of adopting foreign
technology dominates the force of domestic technology transfer. The greater cost in the
experiment discourages firms from adopting domestic technology. Instead, these firms
turn to adopting foreign technology, which enhances the catch-up rate to some extent.
However, the force from adopting domestic technology dominates the other force in the
second half of the period, and the catch-up rate of the bottom firms is reduced much
more than before.
The increase in fixed cost decreases the growth of productivity and innovation expen-
diture as well. The greater cost of adopting domestic technology makes more firms turn
to adopting foreign technology and thus firms with low productivity are less likely to be
productive. This diminishes the growth of productivity in the period. Because the only
most productive firms innovate and the mobility of firms with low productivity is harmed
by greater cost, less firms spend money on innovation and the growth of innovation ex-
penditure is slowed. In a dynamic environment, a thinner tail of productivity distribution
further reduces the technology transfer from productive firms to less productive firms in
the domestic industry. This explains why the differences in productivity and innovation
expenditure between the baseline model and the experiment become greater over time.
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Figure 2.3: Effects of Domestic Technology Transfer
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Notes : The figure shows the effects of domestic technology transfer on the distance to
frontier, and relative productivity, relative expenditure on foreign and domestic technol-
ogy transfer.
We increase the cost of adopting domestic technology to infinity such that we can
quantify the contributions of adopting domestic technology to the growth of productivity
and innovation (Figure 2.3). Clearly, the relative expenditure on domestic technology
transfer is zero in Panel D. The differences between the baseline model (solid line) and the
experiment with infinity cost of adopting domestic technology (dashed-dot line) indicate
that the domestic technology transfer contributes to 57% of the productivity growth and
64% of the innovation expenditure increase.
The other experiment we conduct is to test whether stronger IPR protection helps the
growth. [CCG14] finds a positive correlation between the strength of IPR protection and
relative productivity and they argue the optimal strength of the IPR protection depends
on the stage of development. At the early stage of development, the country has weak
protection to facilitate technology imitation. And the country imposes strong protection
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to encourage innovation. In our model, the bargaining power of the imitator in domestic
technology transfer, θD, determines the profits that the imitatees obtain from selling
technology. When the bargaining power of imitator goes up, the profit of the imitatee
decreases. Therefore, we decreases the value of θD in our second experiment to figure
out the consequences of stronger IPR protection on productivity growth and innovation
expenditure.
Stronger IPR protection has several effects on the technology development of firms.
First, it discourages firms from adopting domestic technology, so these firms turn to
adopting foreign technology, thus reducing the share of firms adopting domestic technol-
ogy. Second, stronger IPR protection leads to greater profits from selling technology to a
certain imitator. But it also decreases the measure of imitators that an imitatee can meet
because of fewer domestic imitator and more firms adopting foreign technology. Third,
the change of IPR protection also induces a change in the share of innovative firms. Be-
cause the experiment affects the optimal growth rate of innovation and the optimal rate
of foreign technology adoption, the returns to these two ways of developing technology
are different and the shares of the two types of firms are changed.
In the experiment, we change the share of profits obtained by the imitatee from 0.6%
to 1.2% (Figure 2.4). We find that the effects on the optimal rates of innovation and
foreign technology transfer are trivial. Because the share obtained by the imitatee is
so low, it changes the optimal decisions of imitatees by less 1 percent. Therefore, the
catch-up rate slows down in the second half of the transition for the same reason as in
the first experiment (Panel A). In the transition, stronger IPR protection decreases the
share of firms adopting domestic technology and productivity growth rate. Productivity
growth has decreased by 35% in the year of 2006 (Panel B). Due to the slowdown of
productivity growth, fewer firms choose to do innovation and the innovation expenditure
drops by 46% (Panel C). Relative domestic transfer expenditure shows a different trend
compared with that in the first experiment. Due to greater IPR protection, domestic
imitator has to pay more at the beginning of the transition. However, there would be
fewer domestic imitators and the technology that domestic imitators can purchase would
be less advanced compared with the case of the baseline model. That is why domestic
transfer payment is less than that in the baseline model after 2001(Panel D).
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Figure 2.4: Effects of Stronger IPR Protection
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Notes : The figure shows the effects of stronger IPR protection on the distance to fron-
tier, and relative productivity, relative expenditure on foreign and domestic technology
transfer.
2.3 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a dynamic transition model featureing an endogenous choice
between innovation and technology adoption. We model the technology transfer payment
as the result of Nash Bargaining. The cost of domestic technology adoption and the bar-
gaining power of the domestic imitator affect productivity growth and expenditure on
innovation in the transition. The theory is based on the significantly positive correlation
between innovation expenditure and relative productivity. The expenditure on domestic
technology increases in both distance to domestic technology frontier and relative pro-
ductivity level. Expenditure on domestic technology is positively correlated with the
productivity growth rate in the industry. The empirical evidence on the level of industry
supports the theory as well. Our model is consistent with the trends of productivity
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growth, decreasing dispersion of the productivity distribution, and rising expenditures
on innovation and domestic technology transfer. The estimated baseline model is shown
to match with the data very well.
We impose several simplifications on the model for the sake of tractability, and we
may relax the simplifications in future research. First, we assume overlapping genera-
tion agents who live only for two periods and simplify the dynamic problem to a static
problem. Compared with the length of the period we study, this assumption may not be
adequate in the quantitative exercise. The other simplification is the market structure
and demand function for the intermediate goods. That China joined in the WTO is an
important event in the period we study, and the accession to WTO expands the market
for productive exporters and induces greater competition, which may encourage these
productive firms to spend more on innovation. Our model does not take the change of
market into consideration and thus the relative innovation expenditure in our model does
not match the data very well after 2002.
Despite our model having the limitations above, we believe our paper casts some
light on the catch-up of developing countries. The literature emphasizes the role of for-
eign technology transfer in the developing country. We realize the importance of domestic
technology transfer among domestic firms, although most domestic firms have much lower
productivity than the world frontier. In this paper we tell a story including both the tra-
ditional mechanism and the new mechanism involving the domestic technology transfer.
We find domestic technology transfer contributes most to productivity growth and the
rise of innovation expenditure. The economic transition for developing countries would
be facilitated if policymakers take the mechanism into consideration.
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CHAPTER 3
Immigration and Gains from Openness
3.1 Introduction
The United States is the largest immigrant country of the world. Over last three decades,
immigrants fraction of the total employment in the United States has risen 6.9% to 17.2%.
During the same period, immigrant entrepreneurs who receive great attentions account for
a much larger share of the total entrepreneur population, from 7.2% to 20.8%. Although
immigrant entrepreneurs are frequently discussed , most work doesn’t involve quantitative
examination on their effects. Some papers are descriptive [Fai12, FL15, Hun11, KK16].
Some researchers focus specially on high-tech sector [Sax00, WSR07]. We quantify how
immigration to the United States and the rest countries of the world affects the welfare
of the US natives and people in the rest of the world. We further explore the interaction
between immigration and international trade.
In this paper, we construct a general equilibrium multi-country model of immigration
and trade in which the agents endogenously decide whether to be entrepreneurs or workers
and make decisions on the places they live in. The agents have heterogeneous abilities in
working and entrepreneurship in different countries. The immigrants face country-specific
immigration frictions. These frictions reduce the welfare of the immigrants but do not
affect the productivity and the income of the immigrants.
immigration affects the native entrepreneurs and workers in the destination country.
The immigrant entrepreneurs establish more firms and create job opportunities, which
benefits workers but induces stronger competition with existing native entrepreneurs.
Workers are heterogeneous in skill and perfect substitutes no matter they are natives
or immigrants.Thus, immigrant workers reduce relatively working income and crowd out
native workers. Instead of being unemployment workers crowded out run their own busi-
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ness. The crowd-out loss is mitigated because of alternative occupational choice. immi-
grants increase the varieties of destination economy by running business or crowding out
would-be native workers to produce new products. The native entrepreneurs and work-
ers benefit equally from the increases number of varieties. The other occupation-neutral
effect of immigration on the natives is congestion. Following fixed amenity framework
[HMR08, RS08, AA14], we assume the increase of population causes congestion external-
ity. One interpretation of congestion externality is that individuals demand for housing
with fixed supply and the inflow of immigrants increases local housing price.
The immigration affects the origin countries of immigrants as well. The immigrant
entrepreneurs produce different varieties in the destination country and sell them to
the markets of the destination and origin countries and the rest of the world under
monopolistic competition [Mel03]. An immigrant entrepreneur could be more productive
after moving to the destination country , which lowers the cost of the variety. However, the
price of the variety faced by people living in his origin country includes the international
trade cost between the origin and the destination countries. The welfare of people living
in the origin country relies on the change of the immigrant entrepreneur’s productivity
and the international trade cost.
We contribute to the literature on estimating welfare impacts of migration. The lit-
erature focuses on labor productivity differences across countries and gains generated by
labor moving to more productive countries [KV07, KV09, BJ12, DW02, Ken13]. With-
out considering congestion effect, they find huge welfare gains of the world economy but
immigration reduces welfare of native individuals who are workers in the destination
country. Two exceptions that emphasize the endogenous variety are [IP09] and [GLO14].
In their papers, immigrants are only working labors. More firms enter the market due to
labor increase and provide more varieties. For [IP09], workers are heterogeneous in skills
and employed in different sectors. Depending on skills of immigrants, workers in differ-
ent sectors receive different shocks. However, production technology doesn’t change with
inflow of people and firms in the same sector are homogeneous. In [GLO14], firm pro-
ductivity is Pareto distributed and those entrants after the inflow of labor have relatively
lower productivity. My paper differs from the literature and it is possible that immi-
grant entrepreneurs improve average productivity of destination if they are of high en-
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trepreneurship, which echoes recent report on successful immigrant entrepreneurs such as
Arianna Huffington, Elon Musk, and Sergey Brin. Whether the immigrant entrepreneurs
could increase the productivity of the destination country depends on the immigration
friction between the origin and the destination countries. The productivity of the immi-
grant entrepreneurs would be high enough to increase the productivity if the immigrant
entrepreneurs face high friction.
To quantify the welfare effects of immigration to the United States, one counterfactual
experiment is conducted in which the United States closes it border while international
immigration still exists among other countries. Provided the current skill and occupation
composition of immigrants in the United States, native entrepreneurs welfare is improved
by 3.95% and native workers are worse off moderately by 0.98%. The immigration of
the United States also contributes to world welfare by 0.43%. We further compare the
worldwide international immigration and trade autarky with the baseline model, and
figure out the welfare effects of the international immigration and trade. The welfare
gains from immigration is substantial and as high as the gains from international trade.
The gains of different countries range from 5% to 15% and the entrepreneurs gain more
than workers in most countries.
Second, we explore marginal contribution of immigrants to the United States by ori-
gin country and the optimal scheme for immigration frictions. immigrants in the United
States come from all over the world and face immigration country-dependent frictions.
For example, the United States immigration system sets a per country limit. No more
than 7 percent of the visas may be issued to natives of any one independent country in a
fiscal year. Empirical evidence shows great variances in their shares of the United States
population (quantity) and relative incomes (quality) as worker and entrepreneur. For
example, Mexican immigrants account for 3.38% of workers and 5.19% of entrepreneurs
while the average population of Mexico over 1980 to 2015 is 98.10 millions. On contrary,
immigrants from China and India accounts for less than one percent of workers and en-
trepreneurs. In terms of income, Mexican immigrants only receive about half income as
their American cohorts, while Indian earn 43% more income as workers and 46% as en-
trepreneurs than American natives (Appendix 5). We measure the marginal contribution
of immigrants by origin country to the United States as the increase of average welfare
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of the US natives for a marginal increase of immigrant population from the origin coun-
try. We assume the US government can change country-specific immigration frictions
and implement an optimal scheme to maximize the welfare of the US natives. Under the
optimal scheme, the welfare of native entrepreneurs and workers increase by 5.06% and
1.65% relative to those in our baseline parameterization and the total population in the
US increases by 14.7%.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the multi-country
model. Section 3 provides the calibration and parameter values. Section 4 shows the
results of experiments. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
Our framework extends the model of trade in [Mel03] to incorporate occupation and im-
migration decisions. Our model is a monopolistic model with a continuum of endogenous
tradable varieties . Following [GLO14], individuals choose one country to live in and
make occupational choice between entrepreneur and worker.
A. Preferences and Welfare
The world consists of I countries indexed by i, j = 1, ..., I with N0i units of population.
Individuals in different economies have identical preferences. Individuals consume final
good Qi. The final good Qi represents a CES aggregator over a continuum of varieties
from domestic and foreign producers,
Qi = (
∑
j
∫
Ωj
q
ji
(ωj)
σ−1
σ dωj)
σ
σ−1 (3.1)
,where q
ji
(ωj) is the consumption of variety ωj ∈ Ωj produced in country j . σ > 1 is
an elasticity of substitution between any two goods. Given the aggregate consumption,
the demand for each variety of goods ,qji, and expenditure, rji, are
q
ji
= Qi(
p
ji
Pi
)−σ r
ji
= PiQi(
p
ji
Pi
)1−σ (3.2)
,where Pi = [
∑
j
∫
pi(ωj)
1−σdωj]1/(1−σ) is the overall price index in country i. The aggre-
gate income is Ri = PiQi.
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Welfare in country i depends on utility derived from consumption Qi and amenity a
0
i
which is one unique characteristics of the country. Thus the welfare of a native individual
with income yi is
Ui(yi) =
a0i
(Ni)λ
Qi =
a0i
(Ni)λ
yi
Pi
(3.3)
,where N i is the population of country i including immigrants from the rest of world and
λ captures the congestion effect of population. A key implication of this assumption is
that preferences exhibit love of variety: given one’s income and goods, the individual’s
utility increases when the set of goods Ωj increases. Thus, immigrant entrepreneurs affect
the equilibrium set of varieties and have a welfare effect through this channel.
B. Production
There is a continuum of firms run by entrepreneurs, and each chooses to produce a
different variety ω ∈ Ω. Production requires only labor which is inelastically supplied
by workers. Firm production technology is a product of firm specific and sector pro-
ductivity. The output exhibits increasing return to scale with respect to labor used:
qi(ω) = Aφ(ω)l
γ
i , γ > 1, where A and φ(ω) represent sector and firm specific productiv-
ity. A firm with productivity φ in country i maximizes its profits by making decisions on
sales in every market,
pii(φ) = max
pij
∑
pijqij − wili (3.4)
s.t.
∑
j
τijqij =Aiφl
γ
i
qij =RjP
σ−1
j p
−σ
ij
,where τij is iceberg trade cost of variety exporting to country j and qij is the quantity
of the variety. Varieties are tradable but the final goods are not. Trade is subject to the
iceberg costs: τij ≥ 1 units of any variety must be shipped from country i for one unit
to arrive in country j. We assume τii = 1 for all I countries and the triangle inequality
holds: τij ≤ τikτkj for all i, j, k ∈ I. We exclude multinational production and thus labor
used in production only consists of immigrant and native residents. First order condition
reveals the pricing rule of a firm over markets in different countries, pij = τijpii. Given
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the simple pricing rule, producer’s problem becomes choosing optimal domestic price, pii,
pii(φ) = max
pii
Dip
1−σ
ii −
wi
φAi
D
1
γ
i p
−σ
γ
ii
,where Di =
∑
j τ
1−σ
ij RjP
σ−1
j measures the world market demand for goods produced in
country i .The optimal domestic price, revenue, and profits can be expressed as
pii(φ) = [
σ
(σ − 1)γ
wi
Aiφ
D
1−γ
γ
i ]
γ
σ+γ−σγ
ri(φ) = (
(σ − 1)γ
σ
)
(σ−1)γ
σ+γ−σγ (Di(
Aiφ
wi
)(σ−1)γ)
1
σ+γ−σγ
pii(φ) =
σ + γ − σγ
σ
ri(φ)
. A special case when γ = 1 has same results of pricing and profits as [Mel03]. When
γ > 1, the markup of firms is constant as well, σ
(σ−1)γ . The markup is lower than that
in the case where γ = 1. To have these results requires (σ − 1)(γ − 1) < 1. This means
the effect of increasing return to scale is still dominated by substitution effect between
varieties and thus there exist many producers in an economy.
C. Immigration and Occupation
An individual born in country i has entrepreneurship, z, and working ability, l, over
countries. He can choose to be an entrepreneur who runs a firm and claims profits or a
worker employed by others. These abilities are drawn and realized before immigration
and occupation decisions are made. Assume the abilities follow a multivariate Fre´chet
distribution
Gi(z, l) = exp{−
∑
o
∑
j
T oij(oij)
−θ}, i, j = 1, ...I, o = z, l (3.5)
, where oij = zij and oij = lij are entrepreneurship and working ability if the indi-
vidual born in country i works in country j. The parameter θ governs the dispersion
of abilities and a higher θ corresponds to smaller dispersion. The parameter T oij governs
the average ability of the group of people who migrate from country i to j and have
occupation o. According to T oij = hi
o
ij, the average ability depends on the human capital
improvement of origin country, hi, and productivity shock 
o
ij.The immigrants may receive
more education with higher quality in their home country, this is captured by the factor
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hj. The human capital should be affected by destination country as well. However, we
cannot differentiate the human capital contribution from destination country and pro-
ductivity of destination country. Every factor of destination country would be attributed
to productivity. On the other hand, productivity shock oij is generated but not limited
by language and culture differences between the pair of origin and destination economy.
To have tractability with Fre´chet distribution, we assume the relationship between firm
owner’s entrepreneurship and the productivity of the firm can be described by the func-
tion z = φ
(σ−1)γ
σ+γ−σγ and thus the profits of a firm are linear in its owner’s entrepreneurship,
pii(z) =
σ+γ−σγ
σ
(Di(
Ai
wi
)(σ−1)γ)
1
σ+γ−σγ z. Henceforth, firm productivity and entrepreneur-
ship are used interchangeably. The individual makes decision on where to live and work.
He also chooses to be an entrepreneur who claims the profits of his firm or earns wages
for being employed. The problem faced by the individual born in country i and having
abilities {z, l}is
Uij(z, l) = max
j,o∈{z,l},
{Uij(pij(zij)fij), Uij(wjlijfij)} (3.6)
= max
j,o∈{z,l}
{uzijfijzij, ulijfijlij}
, where the utility of an entrepreneur with unit entrepreneurship and a worker with unit
working ability are expressed by
uzij =
σ + γ − σγ
σ
a0i
(Ni)λ
(Di(
Ai
wi
)(σ−1)γ)
1
σ+γ−σγ
Pi
(3.7)
ulij =
a0i
(Ni)λ
wi
Pi
(3.8)
. fij measures the friction one individual faces when he migrates from country i to country
j. The friction mainly reflects non-pecuniary costs the immigrants have to undertake. We
assume it is proportional to the income of immigrant and independent of occupational
choice, capturing the time used to migrate and the probability of failure. The domestic
friction fii = 1 means individuals do not have any cost if they live in the country where
they are born. If fij = 0, the friction is so high that the immigration is forbidden.
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D. Aggregation
An equilibrium of a country i will be characterized by over (0,∞) in each country. In
the equilibrium, the aggregate price Pi is then given by
Pi = [
∑
j
∫ ∞
0
pji(z)
1−σMjµj(z)dz]
1
1−σ . (3.9)
Using the pricing rule, this expression can be written Pi = [
∑
j(
σ
(σ−1)γ
τjiwj
Aj
D
1−γ
γ
j )
γ(1−σ)
σ+γ−σγMj z¯j]
1
1−σ ,
where z¯j =
∫∞
0
zµj(z)dz. z¯j is the weighted average of firm productivity z and is inde-
pendent of the mass of firms Mj. The average productivity z¯ also summarizes other
aggregate variables:
Ri = (
(σ − 1)γ
σ
)
(σ−1)γ
σ+γ−σγMi(Di(
Ai
wi
)(σ−1)γ)
1
σ+γ−σγ z¯i (3.10)
Li =
(σ − 1)γ
σ
Ri
wi
(3.11)
,where Ri denotes the sum of all firms revenue and total output. Li is immigrant and na-
tive efficiency labor used in production. Given the assumption on the ability distribution,
we can derive occupation and immigration share , p¯oji, denoting the share of immigrant
moving from country j to i and choosing occupation o in the population of origin country.
Aggregating across people, the solution to the individual’s choice problem leads to the
share
p¯oji =
T oji(u
o
jifji)
θ∑
s
∑
j T
s
ji(u
s
jifji)
θ
. (3.12)
Occupational choice and immigration decision depend on the overall reward that one
born in country j with mean ability can obtain by migrating to country j and working
in occupation o relative to power mean of people born in country j over all choices. This
expression shows reasons of immigration and occupational choice. The fraction of people
born in country j and working in occupation o is low when human capital is negatively
affected (T oji is low) , the destination country has poor amenity and low income (u
o
ji is
low) , or when those immigrants face a barrier in migrating to country i ( fji is low).
We can also derive the average entrepreneurship, z¯, and working ability, l¯ . The average
quality of immigrants from country j to country i who choose occupation o is
o¯ji = Γ(1− 1
θ
)
(
∑
s
∑
j T
s
ji(u
s
jifji)
θ)
1
θ
uojifji
(3.13)
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,where Γ(1 − 1
θ
) is related to the mean of the Frechet distribution for ability. The rela-
tionship between the share of immigrant, p¯oji, and the average quality, o¯ji is ambiguous.
When the share of immigrant increases due to human capital improvement, average qual-
ity increases as a result. However, average quality in inversely related to the share when
the change comes from greater income, better amenity, or smaller immigration friction.
Since each entrepreneur only runs one firm, the measure of firms equal the measure of
entrepreneurs,
Mi =
∑
j
p¯zjiN
j
0 (3.14)
Aggregating each firm’s export, we find gravity equation, the share of trade flow from
i to j in i′s total output,
Xij =
∫
pijqijdωi∑
j
∫
pijqijdωi
=
Rj(P j/τ ij)σ−1∑
j R
j(P j/τ ij)σ−1
(3.15)
(Equilibrium) Given a set of countries ,I, and initial amenity, population, produc-
tivity, and human capital (ai0, N
i
0, A, h
i) : I → R+ and immigration productivity shock,
bilateral trade and immigration frictions, (τij, 
o
ij, fij) : I × I → R++, a competitive equi-
librium in the world economy consists of choices {j, o} of individuals in every country, a
immigration decision and an occupational choice, immigrant and native efficiency wage
wi such that
1. Each individual chooses the destination country and his occupation that maximizes
his utility Uij(z, l) in equation 3.3, taking his draw of abilities {z, l} as given.
2. Entrepreneurs maximize profits by hiring optimal amount of workers and deciding
pricing of goods in different markets as equation 3.4.
3. Given the country a consumer resides in, he maximizes his utility derived from
consumption as results in equation 3.2.
4. wi clears labor markets of immigrant and native workers in every country. And
the general equilibrium of the model can be solved by following equations:
1. The population of country i after immigration is
Ni =
∑
o
∑
j
p¯ojiN
j
0 (3.16)
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2.The share and average quality of native and immigrant people are described by
equations 3.13 and 3.12. The measure of firms is indicated by equation 3.14.
3. The utility of individual is determined by equations 3.7 and 3.8.
4.Market clearing conditions for immigrant and native workers are
(σ − 1)γ
σ
Ri
wi
=
∑
j
l¯jip¯
l
jiN
j
0 (3.17)
5. The aggregate price, income level, and world market demand are
P 1−σj =
∑
i
(
(σ − 1)γ
σ
Ai
τijwi
D
1− 1γ
i )
(σ−1)γ
σ+γ−σγMiz¯i (3.18)
Ri = (
(σ − 1)γ
σ
)
(σ−1)γ
σ+γ−σγ (Di(
Ai
wi
)(σ−1)γ)
1
σ+γ−σγMiz¯i (3.19)
Di =
∑
j
τ 1−σij RjP
σ−1
j (3.20)
3.3 Calibration
A. Data Description
We restrict our analysis to a set of 57 countries including most OECD countries, populous
developing countries and countries as important source of immigrants to the United
States.We use 1996 CEPII trade data on bilateral trade flow from country i to country
j, piij. We use 2000 UN international immigrant stock data on bilateral immigration
flow from i to j , Nij. Since the data only has immigration flows but doesn’t have
the population of people residing their home country, we use 2000 World Bank total
population data to generate the initial population of people born in country i, N i0 =
Ni +
∑
j Nij −
∑
j Nji, where Ni and N
i
0 represent population in country i with and
without migration. We complement the bilateral immigration data with data on the
occupational choice and income of immigrant in the United States. These data are
available for the United States from 2000 Census and 2001, 2002 American Community
Survey (ACS). All data are averaged over the period, 2000-2002, where possible.
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B. Calibration Procedure
Our general calibration strategy is as follows. First, we can assign values to these parame-
ters without solving the model: the elasticity of substitution,σ, the variance parameter of
skill distribution ,θ, the congestion parameter λ.Then we calibrate parameters such that
the outcomes of the model match certain features of the data: the parameter of increas-
ing return of production γ , each country human capital, hi, and shock to immigrant’s
human capital, ij, the population of people born in country i, N
i
0, local productivity of
each country, Ai, immigration frictions, fij, and the trade iceberg cost τij for countries
i, j = 1, ..., I.
The values of the first group of parameters are showed in Table (3.1). [BW06] estimate
the elasticity of substitution between differentiated varieties which corresponds to σ.
We choose σ = 4 as the baseline value. The parameter λ represents congestion effects
including housing ,traffic and public service. [DNR18] use 192 metropolitan data in the
United States and find the elasticity of amenities to population is −0.32. Given the skill
distribution is multivariate Frechet distribution, the distribution of income of immigrants
from the same origin country follows Frechet distribution with same shape parameter.
Using the US census and ACS data, we calibrate the shape parameter from the equation
V ariance+Mean2
Mean2
=
Γ(1− 2
θ
)
Γ(1− 1
θ
)2
(3.21)
. It turns out that each group by occupation and origin country in the United States has
similar shape parameter. We choose the value of θ which determines the right hand side
to minimize the difference between observed left hand side and right hand side and get
the value θ = 2.35.
We then estimate the trade iceberg cost parameter τij according to [Wau10]. Based
on trade share equation 3.15, we derive the following relationship between home trade
share, bilateral trade share, aggregate price, total income, and trade costs:
Xij
Xii
=
Rj(P j)σ−1
Ri(P i)σ−1
τ 1−σij (3.22)
.Taking logs yields I − 1 equations for each country i:
log(
Xij
Xii
) = Sj − Si − (σ − 1)logτij (3.23)
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Table 3.1: Baseline Parameter Values and Variable Normalization
Parameter Definition Determination Value
σ Elasticity of Substitution [BW06] 4
λ Congestion [DNR18] 0.32
θ Frechet shape Income distribution 2.35
γ Increasing return US Share of entrepreneur 1.23
ai0 Amenity [JK16] Appendix
Ai Productivity Output
N i0 Initial Population Population
Notes : Ai, N
i
0 and a
i
0 are productivity, initial population, and amenity of country i in
our sample. The calibrated values of these countries are presented in the Appendix 5.
,in which Sj = log(R
j(P j)σ−1) represents the market size of the country. To solve the
under-identification problem, we make restrictions on the parameter space and assume
that trade costs take the following functional form:
log(τij) = αln(distij) + b
τ
ij + l
τ
ij + exi + εij (3.24)
, where distij is the distance between country i and j. The variable b
τ
ij equals one
if countries share a border and lτij equals one if people speak same language in those
countries. Otherwise these variables are zero. The variable exi represents an exporter
fixed effect. A country with smaller exporter fixed effect can attract more entrepreneurs
since the trade costs to get access to all rest countries are low. Table (3.2) shows the
estimates of coefficients and exporter fixed effects of the US, Canada, and China. Since
the data is year 1996 and China joined in the WTO in 2001, it is reasonable that China
has larger fixed effects than other two countries.
The average quality of the group of people who immigration from i to j and have
occupation o is determined by the mean parameter T oij = h
o
i 
o
ij. We assume the human
capital contributed by origin country is directly related to the average years of education
from [BL13], log(hoi ) = β
oedui. Similar with [RR13], we reduce the number of parameters
to calibrate by assuming that immigration shocks are a function of distance, whether
countries share a border and a language, and whether these two countries have ever had
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results of Trade Costs
Estimate Standard Error
Geographic Barriers
Dist 0.905 .018
Shared Border -0.783 .112
Common Language -0.952 .080
Fixed Exporter Effects
United States -4.724 .276
Canada -2.641 .275
China -2.409 .276
Notes : We used the data from CEPII Geodist and CEPII Trade (1996). All parameters
were estimated by the OLS regressions according to [Wau10]. We list the fixed exporter
effects of the United States, Canada, and China as examples in the table.
a colonial relationship, respectively,
log(oij) = δ
odistij + l
o
ij + b
o
ij + col
o
ij, o = z, l
,where loij,b
o
ij, and col
o
ij are language, border, and colonial dummies. All these variables
depend on occupation. The variable lδij(b
o
ij, col
o
ij) equals zero if countries share a bor-
der (language, colonial relationship). Then oii = 1 for any i, and o, people residing in
their home country don’t receive human capital shock. We only have income and occu-
pation choice of immigrants and natives in the United States and calculate the relative
income,
incoi,US
incoUS,US
, and relative population,
Noi,US
Noi,US
, of each immigrant group to the native
group. We find the relationship between human capital, immigration shocks, relative
income, and population,
ˆ
(
hioi,US
hUSoUS,US
) =
N oi,US
N oUS,US
NUS0
N i0
(
incoi,US
incoUS,US
)θ (3.25)
Based on the assumptions, we also derive the expression,
log(
hi
o
i,US
hUSoUS,US
) = βo(edui − eduUS) + δodistij + loiUS + boiUS + coloiUS (3.26)
. We choose values of ten variables βo, δo, loiUS, b
o
iUS, col
o
iUS to minimize the difference
between the observed
ˆ
(
hioi,US
hUS
o
US,US
) and (
hi
o
i,US
hUS
o
US,US
) and the number of observations between
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Table 3.3: Calibration Results of Migration, Amenity, and Productivity
Panel.A. Immigration shock and human capital
β δo loij b
o
ij col
o
ij
Entrepreneur 1.23 -1.14 1.09 -1.86 -1.20
Worker 1.32 -0.80 0.99 -0.82 -0.55
Panel.B. Immigration Friction, Amenity, and Productivity
Country 1− fi,US ai0 Ai
Mexico 0.80 1.02 0.19
Canada 0.74 1.13 0.44
China 0.99 0.72 0.04
Source: US Census 2000; CEPII Geodist; Barron-Lee Education Attainment Dataset;
UN Population Division’s Global Migration; [JK16].
Notes : 1− fi,US denotes the immigration friction faced by immigrants from country i to
the US. We list the country-specific parameter values of Mexico, Canada, and China as
examples in Panel B. The values of migration frictions of all the countries in our sample
are provided in Appendix 5 : immigration frictions
2000-2002 is 573 = 171. The results are showed in panel A in table 3. R2 in the last
column of panel.A illustrates how the model matches the features of the data. These
value are high, indicating that our model captures a large fraction of variance of the
observed income and immigration flows.
Finally we calibrate the rest parameters: productivity,Ai, amenity,a
i
0,immigration
frictions, fij, and the parameter of increasing return to scale, γ. We set productivity Ai
such that real GDP in the model matches those in the data.[JK16] propose a summary
statistic for the economic welfare of people in a country, we set amenity,ai0, such that
the average welfare of residents in one country is same as their index. The country-
pair specific immigration friction is set to match bilateral immigration flows. And the
parameter of increasing return to scale γ matches the share of US native entrepreneurs
in the population of the United States, 9.46%. Panel B in table 3 displays the location
characteristics of three countries: Mexico, Canada, and China. Since China has largest
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population but relatively small number of immigrant in the United States, this indicates
Chinese immigrants face extremely high level of friction compared with Mexicans and
Canadians.
3.4 Counterfactuals
We use the parameterized model to conduct a series of counterfactuals in which we vary
trade costs and immigration frictions. First, we show the effects of immigration to the
US by conducting an experiment in which the immigration to the US is allowed. Then
we consider changes in trade costs and immigration frictions such that countries move
from autarky to the baseline 2000 parameterization. Last we figure out the scheme of
frictions to the United Sates which maximizes the average welfare of native residents.
3.4.1 Effects of immigration to the US
In this part we examine the effects of immigration to the US on the welfare and output
of the US and the world. In the experiment, we increase the immigration friction faced
by immigrants moving from other countries to the US to 1 such that no agents born in
other countries would move to the US.
We compare the case in which immigrants can not move to the US with our baseline
parameterization. We find the world welfare increases by 1.7% and the world total output
increases by 2.2% (Panel A and B in Figure 3.1). When the US opens its border to
immigrants from the rest countries in the world, these immigrants would become more
productive after they move to the US. However, the welfare effects are impaired by two
factors negatively: congestion and immigration friction. These factors account for why
the welfare gain is less than the increase of output.
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Figure 3.1: Effects of immigration to the US
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.998
0.999
1
Panel A.World Welfare
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.997
0.998
0.999
1
Panel B.World Total Output
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.996
0.998
1
Panel C.US Native Welfare
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.996
0.998
1
Panel D.US Native Consumption
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.996
0.998
1
Panel E.US Entrepreneur Welfare
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.996
0.998
1
Panel F.US Worker Welfare
Notes : The figure shows how each variable changes with respect to the friction of mi-
grating to the US. The horizontal axis corresponds to the immigration friction and the
vertical axis corresponds to the relative value of the variable when we normalize the values
of the variables in the baseline parameterization to 1.
The immigrants from the rest of the world to the US improve the welfare and consump-
tion of US natives. The welfare of US natives is increased by 3.7% and the consumption
by 3.8%, respectively (Panel C and D in Figure 3.1). Due to the change of immigration
friction, it changes the population of people who are born and live in the US. The welfare
and consumption refer to the average values of the welfare and consumption of people
who are born and live in the US. And the immigration contributes to the welfare of
US native entrepreneurs and workers similarly. The welfare of native entrepreneurs and
workers increases by 3.8% and 3.7%, respectively.
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3.4.2 Immigration and Trade Autarky to Baseline Parameterization
We consider a reduction in immigration frictions and trade costs, moving each country
from autarky to baseline parameterization. When we have immigration autarky, trade
costs are same as the values in the baseline and vice versa.
Figure 3.2: Immigration and Trade Autarky
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Notes : Panel A shows the gains of entrepreneurs and workers from immigration autarky
to the baseline model. Panel B shows the gains of entrepreneurs and workers from trade
autarky to the baseline model. The lines in two panels are 45 degree lines. The axes
represent the percentage gains relative to the corresponding autarky cases.
Panel A (B) of Figure 3.2 plots 100× the log change in welfare in the baseline param-
eterization relative to migration(trade) autarky for entrepreneur’s welfare plotted against
worker welfare for each country in our model. Since each country has endogenous popu-
lation of entrepreneurs and workers, we define the welfare as the average welfare of native
residents. Because the welfare of individuals in each group is linear in their ability, the
average welfare measures the improvement of welfare of every individual. For instance,the
worker welfare of China doesn’t reflect the welfare change of a Chinese immigrant working
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in the United States.
Panel A of Figure 3.2 highlights that the gains from immigration liberalization are
unevenly distributed across countries in our model. For instance, the worker’s and en-
trepreneur’s welfare increases by 13% and 35% in New Zealand and 16% and 32% in
Australia while that in China rises by 0.7% and 0.6%. The graph also demonstrates that
entrepreneur gains have highly positive correlation with worker gains (R2 = 0.75) and
the gains of entrepreneur is as twice large as the gains of worker in the same country.
The intuition behind the correlation is that immigration liberalization increases labor
efficiency in every country and lowers the price level. The variance can be accounted by
for relative increase of the efficiency wage and market size. On average the market size
increases greater than the increase of efficiency wage , therefore entrepreneurs benefit
more than worker from the liberalization. And the variance of access to market leads to
the variances of entrepreneur gains relative to worker gains.
Panel B of Figure 3.2 shows even greater correlation between gains of entrepreneur and
worker(R2 = 0.99). Intuitively, reducing trade costs is equivalent to increase productivity,
resulting in proportional increases of firm profits and efficiency wage. The gains from
trade liberalization are of great variation across countries. The gain of worker rises by
as much as 33% in Netherlands, 29% in Denmark and by as little as 1.9% in Bangladesh
and 1.7% in India.
In summary, reductions in immigration frictions and trade costs tend to raise wel-
fare of entrepreneur and worker. Reducing trade costs increase welfare of entrepreneur
and worker equally while elimination of immigration frictions improves the welfare of
entrepreneur more.
3.4.3 Optimal Immigration Frictions of the US
We now aim to illustrate the welfare gain of the US from changing immigration friction.
We assume the United States can change immigration frictions from all other countries to
the United States as long as those frictions are smaller than one and assume the change of
immigration friction is costless for the US government. We derive optimal immigration
friction for each origin country, which maximizes the aggregate welfare of native US
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residents. Under optimal migration, welfare of entrepreneur and worker increase by 5.06%
and 1.65% relative to those in baseline parameterization and the total population increases
by 14.7%. The policy implication is that the US should relax immigration barrier and
have more immigrants overall.
Figure 3.3: Optimal Immigration Frictions
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BGD
BRA
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
COL
CZE
DEU
DNK
DOM
ECU
ESP
EST
FIN
FRA
GBR
GRC
GTM
HKG
HND
H N
IDNIND
IRL
IRN
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
KOR
LVA
MEX
MYS
NLD
NOR
NZL
PAK
PERPHL
POL
PRT
RUS
SVN
SWE
TUR
UKR
VEN
VNM
ZAF
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
O
pt
im
al
 F
ric
tio
ns
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Frictions in Baseline
ARG
AUSAUTBELGD
BRA
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
COL
CZE
DEU
DNK
DOMECUESP
ESFI
FRA
GBR
GRCGTMHKGHNDH N
IDN
IND
IRI NIS
ITA
J
JPNKOR
LVA
MEX
MYSNLDNORZ
PAKPER
PHL
POL
P T
RUS
S NSW
TURUKR
VEN
VNM
ZAF
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
Sh
ar
e 
of
 O
pt
im
al
 Im
m
ig
ra
nt
 P
op
ul
at
io
n
0 .01 .02 .03 .04
Share of Immigrant Population in Baseline
Notes : Panel A compares the optimal frictions of countries in our sample with the esti-
mated frictions. Panel B shows the shares of immigrant population in the counterfactual
and the baseline model. The solid lines are 45 degree lines. The values of optimal frictions
are shown in Appendix 5.
Panel A of Figure 3.3 demonstrates values of the optimal immigration frictions and
their values in the baseline parameterization. Panel B show the optimal share of immi-
grant population by origin in total US population. Most countries in panel A are below
the red line, which indicates immigration friction for most countries should be relaxed.
For instance the friction faced by immigrants from Belgium drops 0.59 to 0.17 and it drops
from 0.99 to 0.97 for Chinese immigrants. immigration frictions of all countries except
for Slovenia are still smaller than one under optimal scenario, which means immigration
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still needs regulation and restriction. Changing immigration frictions also changes the
population composition. The shares of Chinese and Indian immigrants in total popula-
tion rise from 0.48% to 4.1% and from 0.37% to 5.5% ,respectively. The share accounted
for by Mexican immigrant would decrease from 3.4% to 0.54%.
3.5 Conclusion
International trade is treated as the main economic activity that benefits countries
through their interactions with the rest of the world. We argue that immigration as
another channel should not be ignored. Our paper develops a quantitative multicountry
model that incorporates country-specific immigration friction and trade cost. We allow
countries to differ from another in terms of their amenities, access to the world mar-
ket, population, and productivity of natives. The difference of immigrants in terms of
their occupations are considered and immigrants as entrepreneurs could improve the pro-
ductivity of the destination country and produce more varieties. The calibration of our
model reveals that the immigration to the US increases the welfare of the US natives by
3.7% and improves the welfare of the world by about 1.7%. The worldwide immigration
contributes more to the welfare of the world and the contribution is no less than that
from openness to trade. We further explore how a country could benefit from a proper
immigration policy. By implementing proper immigration policy, the United States could
increase the welfare of native entrepreneurs and workers by 5.1% and 1.6%.
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CHAPTER 4
Appendix 1
4.1 Appendix A.Theoretical proofs
A. Lemma 2.1
In this part, we will prove the properties in Lemma 2.1. The profits maximization problem
of final firms is
Yt = max
kjt,Lft
1
1− αL
α
ft
∫ 1
0
qαjtk
1−α
jt dj −
∫ 1
0
pjtkjtdj − wtLft (4.1)
Using first order conditions, we derive the demand functions for intermediate goods
and labor are
pjt = L
α
ftq
α
jtk
α−1
jt (4.2)
wt =
α
1− αL
α−1
ft
∫ 1
0
qαjtk
1−α
jt dj (4.3)
The problem of the intermediate producer is
pijt = max
kjt
pjtkjt − wtkjt/q¯t (4.4)
We plug equation 4.2 in the problem 4.4 and derive the first order condition of the
optimal quantity,
kjt = ((1− α) q¯t
wt
)
1
αLftqjt (4.5)
Thus the profit of the intermediate firm is
pijt = α((1− α) q¯t
wt
)
1−α
α Lftqjt (4.6)
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We plug the equations of different intermediate firms 4.2 and 4.5 into the equation
4.1, and we have a simplified profit function of final firm,
Yt = max
Lft
α
1− αLft((1− α)
q¯t
wt
)
1−α
α q¯t − wtLft (4.7)
The first order condition of labor input in the final sector indicates
α
1− α((1− α)
q¯t
wt
)
1−α
α q¯t = wt (4.8)
Therefore, we can solve the wage rate,
wt = α
α(1− α)1−2αq¯t (4.9)
This means the wage rate is proportional to the average productivity of the interme-
diate sector. Plugging equation 4.9 into the profit function of the intermediate firm 4.6,
we have
pijt = α
α(1− α)2(1−α)Lftqjt (4.10)
Given the wage rate 4.9, the optimal quantity of the intermediate good 4.5, and the
production technology, we obtain the labor demand in the intermediate sector,
ljt =
(1− α)2
α
qjt
q¯t
Lft (4.11)
The aggregation of labor over intermediate firms is∫ 1
0
ljtdj =
(1− α)2
α
Lft
The labor market clear equation is
Lft +
∫ 1
0
ljtdj = L¯
,where L¯ is a constant labor supply. And thus the labor employed by the final sector is
Lft = (1 +
(1− α)2
α
)−1L¯ (4.12)
This equation indicates that the share of labor employed by the final sector is constant
over time. Last, we apply equation 4.12 to equation 4.10 and have
pijt = α
α(1− α)2(1−α)(1 + (1− α)
2
α
)−1L¯qjt = pi∗qjt
Given the constant labor supply, the profits of intermediate firms are linear in their
productivity and the coefficient is invariant over time.
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A. Proposition 2.1
In this part, we derive the optimal growth rate of innovation and the optimal rate of
foreign technology adoption. We plug equation 2.12 into equation 2.8 and obtain
piRt (qt−1) = max
γt
pi∗(1 + γt)qt−1 − (χRγψt qt−1 + ηRqt−1) + τD((1 + γt)qt−1, θD)
= max
γt
pi∗(1 +
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD))(1 + γt)qt−1 − (χRγψt qt−1 + ηRqt−1)
− s
D
t
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)pi∗Ej(qj|GDt−1)
(4.13)
The first order condition of γt indicates the optimal value is
γ∗t = ((1 +
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)) pi
∗
ψχR
)
1
ψ−1
Given the optimal growth rate, we have the maximum of profits is
piRt (qt−1) = pi
∗(1+
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1−θD))(1+ψ − 1
ψ
γ∗t )qt−1−ηRqt−1−
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1−θD)pi∗Ej(qj|GDt−1)
Similarly, we combine equation 2.9 with equation 2.14 and 2.13, and we have
piFt (qt−1) = max
λt
pi∗(qt−1 + λtA¯)− χFλβt A¯− τ˜F (θF ) + τD(qt−1 + λtA¯, θD)
= max
λt
pi∗(qt−1 + λtA¯)− χFλβt A¯− (1− θF )(pi∗λtA¯+
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)pi∗λtA¯)
+
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)pi∗(qt−1 + λtA¯− Ej(qj|GDt−1))
= max
λt
pi∗(1 +
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD))(qt−1 + θFλtA¯)− χFλβt A¯−
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)pi∗Ej(qj)
Using the first order condition, we derive the optimal rate of foreign technology adop-
tion,
λ∗t = ((1 +
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD))pi
∗θF
βχF
)
1
β−1
If the firm adopts foreign technology with the optimal rate, the profit is
piFt (qt−1) = pi
∗(1 +
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD))(qt−1 + β − 1
β
θFλtA¯)− s
D
t
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD)pi∗Ej(qj|GDt−1)
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A. Proposition 2
In this part, we derive the thresholds in the support and the regularity conditions that
make the proposition hold. We first derive the threshold between innovation and adoption
of foreign technology. The difference between these two developments is
piRt (qt−1)− piFt (qt−1) =(1 +
sDt
sRt + s
F
t
(1− θD))(ψ − 1
ψ
γ∗t qt−1 −
β − 1
β
θFλ∗t A¯)− ηRqt−1
=(1 + s∗t )(
ψ − 1
ψ
γ∗t qt−1 −
β − 1
β
θFλ∗t A¯)− ηRqt−1
,where s∗t =
sDt
sRt +s
F
t
(1 − θD) for simplicity. If (1 + s∗t )ψ−1ψ γ∗t > ηR, then the difference
increases in productivity and the productivity that makes the firm indifferent between
innovation and foreign technology adoption is
qRFt−1 =
(1 + s∗t )
β−1
β
θFλ∗t A¯
(1 + s∗t )
ψ−1
ψ
γ
∗
t
− ηR (4.14)
The difference between the adoption of foreign and domestic technology is
piFt (qt−1)− piDt (qt−1) =(s∗t + θD + ηD)qt−1 − s∗tEj(qj|GDt−1)− θD
∫
qdGt(q|q ∈ ΦR ∪ΦF )
The difference increases in the productivity of the firm as well, and the threshold is
qDFt−1 =
s∗tEj(qj|GDt−1) + θD
∫
qdGt(q|q ∈ ΦR ∪ ΦF )
s∗t + θD + ηD
(4.15)
Equation 4.14 and 4.15 shows that given the distribution of productivity and other
firms’ choice, the differences between innovation and foreign technology adoption and
between foreign and domestic technology adoption increase in productivity. Given the
distribution of productivity, these two equations are two implicit equations for qDFt−1 and
qRFt−1. To guarantee the existence of these two thresholds, we require
qDFt−1 > q
M
t (4.16)
qRFt−1 > q
DF
t−1 (4.17)
The first condition means that the threshold between foreign and domestic technology
adoptions is greater than the lower bound of the support. If the condition is violated,
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there will be no firm adopting domestic technology. The second condition shows the
inequality between two thresholds and no firm will choose to adopt foreign technology if
this condition is violated. To prove the existence of the thresholds during the transition,
we only need to show the existence of the threshold in the initial period. In the section
of parameter estimation, we assume the initial distribution is Pareto distribution and the
distribution is G0(q) = 1− ( q
M
0
q
)b.
We first derive a sufficient condition for the existence of the threshold between firms
adopting domestic and foreign technology. We assume that there is no firm adopting
domestic technology in the initial period such that s∗0 = 0. In this case, the optimal rates
of growth are
γ∗0 = (
pi∗
ψχR
)
1
ψ−1
λ∗0 = (
pi∗θF
βχF
)
1
β−1
And the threshold is
qDF0 =
θD
∫∞
qM0
qdG1(q)
θD + ηD
≥
θD
∫∞
qM0
qdG0(q)
θD + ηD
=
θD
θD + ηD
b
b− 1q
M
0 (4.18)
Therefore the threshold exists if
θD
θD + ηD
b
b− 1 > 1⇔
θD
ηD
> b− 1 (4.19)
We show the sufficient condition for the existence of the threshold between firms
adopting foreign technology and innovating. We assume the measure of firms adopting
foreign technology is close to 0 in the initial period and thus the sum of shares of firms
doing innovation and adopting domestic technology is 1,
sD0 = 1− sR0 (4.20)
And
s∗0 = 1 +
sD0
sR0
(1− θD) (4.21)
Given the Pareto distribution, the share of innovative firms is
sR0 = (
qM0
qRF0
)b (4.22)
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Plugging equation 4.22 into 4.20 and 4.21, we obtain
sD0 = 1− (
qM0
qRF0
)b (4.23)
s∗0 =
(qRF0 )
b − (qM0 )b
(qM0 )
b
(1− θD) (4.24)
We further get the expressions of the optimal rates,
λ∗0 = (
(1− θD)(qRF0 )b + θD(qM0 )b
(qM0 )
b
pi∗θF
βχF
)
1
β−1 (4.25)
γ∗0 = (
(1− θD)(qRF0 )b + θD(qM0 )b
(qM0 )
b
pi∗
ψχR
)
1
ψ−1 (4.26)
Plugging these equations into equation 4.14, we have
qRF0 =
β−1
β
θF (pi
∗θF
βχF
)
1
β−1 (
(1−θD)(qRF0 )b+θD(qM0 )b
(qM0 )
b )
β
β−1
ψ−1
ψ
(
(1−θD)(qRF0 )b+θD(qM0 )b
(qM0 )
b )
ψ
ψ−1 − ηR
A¯ (4.27)
We find the only unknown in the equation 4.27 is qRF0 , which means the value of q
RF
0
can be solved from the equation.
Plugging these equations into equation 4.15, we have
qDF0 =
s∗tEj(qj|GD0 ) + θD
∫
qdG1(q|q ∈ ΦR)
s∗t + θD + ηD
=
s∗t (
b
b−1(q
M
0 − (q
M
0 )
b
(qRF0 )
b )) + θ
D(1 + γ∗0)
s∗t + θD + ηD
(4.28)
And the last condition is qRF0 > q
DF
0 .
Appendix B Empirical Appendix
B Productivity
In this paper, we introduce the methods we used to measure productivity [BVZ12]. Pro-
ductivity is measured by the following equation
ln(TFPit) = qit − s˜itlit − (1− s˜it)kit
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Table 4.1: Changes in Productivity
Year Number of Firms TFP US TFP Weighted Average Distance
1998 63488 222 4609 3.91
1999 64739 235 4668 3.78
2000 65739 263 4579 3.80
2001 65401 305 4694 3.65
2002 72766 436 4400 3.69
2003 78304 415 4445 3.60
2004 118778 418 4260 3.59
2005 104932 547 4597 3.66
2006 114659 565 4562 3.52
,where qit, lit, and kit are the log value of output (value added), labor (wage bill)
and capital stock, and s˜it is the average wage bill in value added. The capital stock
is constructed as [BVZ12]. After calculating the productivity of each firm, we take the
average of firm productivity in the same industry, compare the values with those of the
US counterparts and derive the relative productivity. The calculation of US productivity
uses the NBER-CES manufacturing data. The NBER-CES manufacturing data provides
industry-level information on value added, capital stock, and wage bills. Using the same
productivity equation, we obtain the productivity of the US industry. Given the purchase
power parity conversion factor from the World Bank, we convert the Chinese data and
make the productivity of Chinese firms comparable to the US productivity. Then we
derive the measurement of distance to frontier as the log difference between the 90th and
10th percentile firms in term of productivity. We report the results of the calculations in
Table ??.
We find two features of manufacturing during the transition: the rapid growth of the
relative TFP and the decreasing distance to frontier. The rapid growth is well known in
the literature. But the other feature is newly documented. We check the robustness of
the second feature based on two aspects. We first report the average distances to frontier
calculated in different ways based on different samples. The average of the distances to
frontier at the industry level is calculated in two ways: an arithmetic average and an
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Table 4.2: Distance to Frontier
Year W. Average Average W. Average/Private Average/Private
1998 3.91 4.08 2.82 2.79
1999 3.78 3.84 2.81 2.75
2000 3.80 3.89 2.70 2.66
2001 3.65 3.71 2.58 2.60
2002 3.69 3.54 2.61 2.52
2003 3.60 3.42 2.54 2.43
2004 3.59 3.48 2.53 2.45
2005 3.66 3.30 2.54 2.45
2006 3.52 3.27 2.56 2.43
Notes : W. Average is the weighted average of distances in different industries of the full
sample. Average represents the arithmetic mean of distance in different industries of the
full sample. Columns with /Private are values from the sample of private firms.
average weighted by value added. We calculate the distances of two samples as well:
one sample consists of all firms covered by the dataset and the other sample is full of
private firms. A private firm is defined as a firm whose share is owned by private owners
is greater than 50%. Table ?? shows various measurements of the distances in different
samples.
We can find that the trend that the distance to frontier is decreasing is robust no
matter which sample and method we use to calculate the values.No matter which method
we use, the distance to frontier of the full sample decreases faster than that of the sample
of private-owned firms. The difference can be explained by the reform on state-owned
enterprises (SOE). During the transition, the inefficient SOEs gradually exit and private-
owned firms with greater productivity enter the market. The full sample that includes
the entry and exit of SOE exhibits a greater rate of catch-up. Moreover, the decreases
of the weighted values are smaller than those of the arithmetic ones in both samples.
This means that the industry with greater value added changes less dramatically than
other industries. To verify the robustness of the trends, we further provide data on
the changes of different industries in Table ??. We notice that most of industries have
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decreasing distance to frontier during the transition except for two industries: Printing,
Reproduction of Recording Media and Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery. We
can draw the conclusion that the manufacturing sector in China witnesses the decreasing
distance to frontier in the short period.
B.2 Algorithm and Model Fit
To simulate the process of transition, we randomly draw one million of firms with het-
erogeneous productivity from the initial distribution. First, we create a grid of different
parameter values. Given one set of estimated parameters, we solve the growth rate and
the thresholds between innovation and technology transfer {λt, γt, qDFt−1, qRFt−1} given the
distribution, Gt−1(q). Then we update the productivity of each firm and derive the dis-
tribution of these firms in the next period, Gt(q), given the optimal decisions of these
firms. Iterating the steps before would generate the distributions of productivity in the
transition and We calculate the value of the SMM objective function. We can find the
minimum of the objective function values under the parameters on the grid. Table 7
provides moments in the data and moments generated by the estimated parameters in
the model.
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Table 4.3: Distance to Frontier across Industries
Code Industry Name Dist. 1998 Dist. 2006
15 Beverage 3.60 2.97
16 Tobacco 4.12 2.22
17 Textile 2.58 2.21
18 Textile Wearing Apparel Footware and Caps 2.30 1.88
19 Leather Fur Feather and Its Products 2.52 2.35
20 Wood Bamboo Rattan Palm Straw 2.68 2.15
21 Furniture 2.79 2.22
22 Paper and Paper Products 2.40 2.22
23 Printing Reproduction of Recording Media 2.99 3.11
24 Articles for Culture Education and Sport Activity 2.90 2.89
25 Petroleum Coking Processing of Nucleus Fuel 2.52 2.18
26 Chemical Raw Material and Chemical Products 2.83 2.74
27 Medicines 2.85 2.57
28 Chemical Fiber 2.58 2.32
29 Rubber 2.67 2.16
30 Plastic 2.82 2.64
31 Non-metallic Mineral Products 2.66 2.52
32 Ferrous Metals 3.13 2.43
33 Nonferrous Metals 2.86 2.59
34 Metal Products 2.54 2.25
35 General Purpose Machinery 2.76 2.30
36 Special Purpose Machinery 2.35 2.48
Notes : The industry names are cited from the table of Industrial classification for na-
tional economic activities published by National Bureau of Statistics of China without
alteration.
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Table 4.4: Moments in the data and model
Distance to Frontier Domestic Transfer Payment
Year Data Model Data Model
1998 3.91 3.91 8.47% 6.45%
1999 3.78 3.81 6.65% 4.56%
2000 3.80 3.75 10.76% 3.58%
2001 3.65 3.71 12.70% 3.31%
2002 3.69 3.69 11.52% 3.82%
2003 3.61 3.67 13.39% 5.43%
2004 3.60 3.64 19.00% 8.66%
2005 3.66 3.60 28.10% 14.67%
2006 3.52 3.54 27.28% 25.48%
Notes : The table shows the trends of distance to frontier and domestic transfer payment
based on the data and generated in the model from 1998-2006.
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CHAPTER 5
Appendix 2
Appendix A. Empirical Appendix
A.Population and Income of Immigrant
In this part of appendix, we provide the immigrant from several countries in the United
State and this part shows the variances in population and income. Table ?? tabulates
shares of immigrant workers and entrepreneurs by origin country. Mexican immigrants
account for 3.38% of workers and 5.19% of entrepreneurs while the average population
of Mexico over 1980 to 2015 is 98.10 millions. This indicates about 10% of Mexican
population migrated to the United States. A contrast happens to Chinese and Indian
immigrants. Both countries have more than one billion population during the period while
immigrants from those two countries accounts for less than one percent of workers and
entrepreneurs. Compared with natives, immigrants are more likely to be entrepreneurs.
Although that more immigrants tend to be self-employed works for every origin country,
huge heterogeneity still exists in occupational choice. Take India and Korea as examples.
The probability of becoming entrepreneurs for Indian immigrants is moderately higher
than the one for natives while the probability for Korean immigrants is more than doubled
likely to be entrepreneurs. Combining with the analysis on the effect of occupational
choice on natives, the contribution of immigrants from different countries can be various.
Table ??gf further demonstrates the heterogeneity of relative incomes in terms of
origin country. Mexican immigrants, the largest group among all immigrants, are much
less productive than the natives. They receive about half income as their American
cohorts. In contrast, Indian immigrants do much better. They earn 43% more income as
workers and 46% as entrepreneurs than American natives.
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Table 5.1: Average Share of Immigrants by Occupation and Origin Country, 1980-2015
Origin Country Worker % Entrepreneur % Population millions
U.S. 85.26 83.20 273.6
Mexico 3.38 5.19 98.10
Canada 0.34 0.52 30.06
Germany 0.45 0.51 80.63
U.K. 0.18 0.26 59.24
India 0.81 0.87 1006
China 0.73 0.82 1210
Korea 0.33 0.81 45.40
Notes : The data used in the table consists of IPUMS USA U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000;
American Community Survey 2001-2015; United Nations Population Division data.
Table 5.2: Average Relative Income of Immigrants by Occupation and Origin Country,
1980-2015
Origin Country Worker Entrepreneur RGDP per capita
U.S. 1 1 1
Mexico 0.48 0.58 0.17
Canada 1.26 1.47 0.82
Germany 1.06 1.15 0.83
U.K. 1.27 1.95 0.81
India 1.43 1.46 0.02
China 0.97 1.20 0.06
Korea 0.93 1.04 0.37
Notes : The data used in the table consists of IPUMS USA U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000;
American Community Survey 2001-2015; United Nations Population Division data.
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A.Population, Productivity, and Amenity
In this part, we provide values of population, productivity, and amenity of every country
in our sample. The variable values of the United States are normalized to 1 for the
conveniecce of comparision. The country names are world bank country codes.
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Country Population Amenity TFP Country Population Amenity TFP
ARG 0.13 0.72 0.22 IRL 0.01 0.84 0.70
AUS 0.07 1.15 0.91 IRN 0.23 1.02 0.16
AUT 0.03 1.05 0.85 ISL 0.001 1.33 1.12
BEL 0.04 1.13 0.83 ISR 0.02 0.99 0.63
BGD 0.48 0.52 0.02 ITA 0.20 1.12 0.78
BRA 0.64 0.54 0.12 JAM 0.01 0.66 0.13
CAN 0.11 1.08 0.82 JPN 0.47 1.15 0.83
CHE 0.02 0.98 0.87 KOR 0.17 0.88 0.45
CHL 0.06 0.56 0.20 LVA 0.01 1.22 0.25
CHN 4.63 0.61 0.07 MEX 0.38 0.96 0.23
COL 0.15 0.60 0.09 MYS 0.08 0.43 0.15
CZE 0.04 1.22 0.48 NLD 0.06 1.02 0.86
DEU 0.29 1.03 0.77 NOR 0.02 0.83 0.81
DNK 0.02 0.98 0.76 NZL 0.01 1.16 0.71
DOM 0.03 0.88 0.16 PAK 0.50 0.58 0.04
ECU 0.05 0.74 0.09 PER 0.10 0.78 0.10
ESP 0.15 1.24 0.77 PHL 0.29 0.48 0.05
EST 0.01 1.04 0.30 POL 0.14 1.22 0.31
FIN 0.02 1.07 0.74 PRT 0.04 1.05 0.51
FRA 0.21 1.29 0.91 RUS 0.51 0.96 0.21
GBR 0.21 1.27 0.90 AVK 0.02 1.40 0.42
GRC 0.04 1.31 0.70 SVN 0.01 1.18 0.60
GTM 0.04 0.60 0.07 SWE 0.03 1.20 0.91
HKG 0.02 0.58 0.59 TUR 0.23 1.34 0.22
HND 0.02 0.91 0.07 UKR 0.17 0.88 0.13
HUN 0.04 1.02 0.34 VEN 0.09 0.81 0.15
IDN 0.78 0.49 0.06 VNM 0.28 0.62 0.04
IND 3.86 0.64 0.04 ZAF 0.16 0.20 0.05
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A. Immigration Frictions
In this part, we show the immigration frictions we calibrated based on our model and the
optimal immigration frictions that maximize the welfare of US natives.
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Country Calibrated Fric. Optimal Fric. Country Calibrated Fric. Optimal Fric.
ARG 0.10 0.26 IRL 0.51 0.65
AUS 0.19 0.39 IRN 0.28 0.35
AUT 0.64 0.79 ISL 0.98 0.99
BEL 0.41 0.83 ISR 0.45 0.55
BGD 0.01 0.01 ITA 0.36 0.44
BRA 0.03 0.07 JAM 0.36 0.30
CAN 0.20 0.42 JPN 0.22 0.40
CHE 0.53 0.77 KOR 0.17 0.22
CHL 0.06 0.14 LVA 0.34 0.38
CHN 0.01 0.03 MEX 0.26 0.12
COL 0.08 0.14 MYS 0.03 0.05
CZE 0.47 0.73 NLD 0.31 0.50
DEU 0.27 0.36 NOR 0.42 0.66
DNK 0.39 0.64 NZL 0.21 0.39
DOM 0.27 0.28 PAK 0.02 0.04
ECU 0.10 0.14 PER 0.05 0.09
ESP 0.18 0.46 PHL 0.04 0.02
EST 0.24 0.37 POL 0.32 0.37
FIN 0.36 0.62 PRT 0.78 0.53
FRA 0.32 0.49 RUS 0.06 0.13
GBR 0.32 0.42 SVK 0.01 0.01
GRC 0.83 0.74 SVN 0.64 0.99
GTM 0.20 0.19 SWE 0.31 0.51
HKG 0.33 0.24 TUR 0.08 0.18
HND 0.18 0.20 UKR 0.11 0.16
HUN 0.28 0.38 VEN 0.08 0.24
IDN 0.01 0.03 VNM 0.04 0.02
IND 0.01 0.03 ZAF 0.01 0.03
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